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A B S T R A C T
Data science and psychiatry have diverse epistemic cultures that come together in data-driven initiatives (e.g.,
big data, machine learning). The literature on these initiatives seems to either downplay or overemphasize
epistemic differences between the fields. In this paper, we study the convergence and divergence of the epistemic
cultures of data science and psychiatry. This approach is more likely to capture where and how the cultures
differ and gives insights into how practitioners from both fields find ways to work together despite their dif-
ferences. We introduce the notions of “epistemic virtues” to focus on epistemic differences ethnographically, and
“trading zones” to concentrate on how differences are negotiated. This leads us to the following research
question: how are epistemic differences negotiated by data science and psychiatry practitioners in a hospital-
based data-driven initiative? Our results are based on an ethnographic study in which we observed a Dutch
psychiatric hospital department developing prediction models of patient outcomes based on machine learning
techniques (September 2017 – February 2018). Many epistemic virtues needed to be negotiated, such as com-
pleteness or selectivity in data inclusion. These differences were traded locally and temporarily, stimulated by
shared epistemic virtues (such as a systematic approach), boundary objects and socialization processes. Trading
became difficult when virtues were too diverse, differences were enlarged by storytelling and parties did not
have the time or capacity to learn about the other. In the discussion, we argue that our combined theoretical
framework offers a fresh way to study how cooperation between diverse practitioners goes and where it can be
improved. We make a call for bringing epistemic differences into the open as this makes a grounded discussion
possible about the added value of data-driven initiatives and the role they can play in healthcare.
1. Introduction
Data-driven initiatives aim to analyse large volumes of data from
varied sources to improve healthcare delivery by predicting future
health risks and treatment responses (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier,
2014; Murdoch and Detsky, 2013). Examples of such initiatives are
machine learning applications that analyse medical images (Sample,
2018) or predict readmissions on intensive care units (PacMed, 2019)
and artificial intelligence systems that assist in the diagnosis of cancer
(Somsashekhar et al., 2017).
Such initiatives often come surrounded by promissory discourses
that emphasize how large-scale or innovative data analysis will result in
valid information to be used to enhance healthcare provision. These
discourses result in a strong positive rhetoric about data-driven in-
itiatives and as such drives their implementation. However, more
cautionary discourses frame these initiatives in more critical terms and
see the new initiatives as only a possible (or even a risk) to current
epistemic practices in the healthcare field (Stevens et al., 2018).
As fields originating in different disciplines, medical and data sci-
entist communities have diverse epistemic practices, which come to-
gether in data-driven initiatives. Epistemic practices guide how mem-
bers of a field propose, communicate, evaluate and legitimize
knowledge. These epistemic practices are part of particular epistemic
cultures (Knorr Cetina, 1981) that can be described as sets of specific
norms, values, beliefs and traditions, that are “bonded through affinity,
necessity and historical incidence” (Knorr Cetina, 1999:1). This means
that epistemic cultures are known for specific activities for reasoning
and establishing evidence, thereby determining what and how we know
in communities.
The literature on data-driven techniques seems to either downplay
or overemphasize the epistemic differences between data science and
medical fields. On the one hand, data science scholars and some med-
ical professionals easily dismiss their differences (e.g. Amato et al.,
2013; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2014; Murdoch and Detsky,
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2013). They imply that it is only a matter of time before the methods
and standards of data science become part of established medical
practice, thus suggesting an ultimate trajectory of convergence that
downplays distinctions between their epistemic practices.
On the other hand, scholars are critical of the evidentiary claims of
data scientists and primarily stress the epistemic differences. Some
medical professionals explain in detail where and how the methods of
both communities differ by theorizing on the specific role of data-
driven approaches. They contrast grand concepts like causality and
correlations and argue that data science can, for example, only be used
to generate hypotheses and to explore valuable research directions (e.g.
Khoury and Ioannidis, 2014). They argue for the specific use of data-
driven approaches by highlighting the distinctions in terms of methods
and evidentiary standards.
The aim of this paper is to study the concrete negotiation of differences
in the epistemic cultures of data science and medicine without assuming
either absolute incommensurability or deterministic complacency. Earlier
studies about technological innovations have shown us that comparing
(downplaying or emphasizing) the distinctions with the status quo is not
helpful (Janssen, 2016; Smits, 2002; Van Lente, 2012) and we argue that it
is more interesting to study where and how the epistemic cultures of data
science and medicine overlap and differ. Such an approach is more likely to
capture all the nuances, efforts and workarounds in practice. In addition, a
more detailed empirical understanding of the negotiations in practice can
also provide useful insights into how practitioners from diverse fields find
ways to work with each other despite epistemic differences. This has
broader implications for interdisciplinary knowledge practices that are in-
creasingly more common and more expected (e.g. large European projects)
(Rathenau, 2018).
We conducted a case study of a data-driven initiative in the context
of psychiatry. Psychiatry is a particularly interesting case to study the
introduction of data-driven initiatives as this field is characterized by
considerable uncertainty relating to disease ontology and treatment
effects. Moreover, it relies primarily on narratives of patients and
qualitative questionnaires to make sense of patients’ conditions and
guide treatment decisions. This means that uncertainty related to data
collection and use, that is also part of other fields of medicine, is am-
plified in the field of psychiatry.
The paper is based on an ethnographic, empirical study of the de-
velopment and implementation of a hospital-based data-driven in-
itiative in the Netherlands. Within this initiative, data scientists were
brought into a psychiatric hospital department to develop prediction
models of patient outcomes based on machine learning techniques. We
approach this initiative through the sensitizing concepts of “epistemic
virtues” (Daston and Galison, 2007) and “trading zone” (Galison,
1997). The notion of epistemic virtues enables us to ethnographically
focus on the differences in epistemic cultures, while the concept of
trading zones allows us to zoom in on how the differences are nego-
tiated. This leads to the following research question: how are epistemic
differences negotiated by data scientists and psychiatrists in a hospital-based
data-driven initiative?
In the next section, we sketch the theoretical background and elaborate
on epistemic differences by introducing the concepts of epistemic virtues
and trading zones. We explain how this combination helps analyse the
practices in the initiative. This is followed by the case description and
methodology. In the results, we introduce the data-driven initiative and
present two cases from our fieldwork that illustrate the process of trading
epistemic differences. The discussion concentrates on the role of epistemic
virtues and how they play a role in interdisciplinary cooperation.
2. Theoretic framework
2.1. Epistemic differences
A central theme within science and technology studies (STS) has
been critiques and reflections on the idea of “epistemic unity of the
sciences” (Galison and Stump, 1995). In this tradition, Knorr Cetina
(1981; 1999) developed her work on “epistemic cultures”. She is known
for her ethnographic comparison between experimental high-energy
physics and molecular biology. She shows that knowledge is created in
diverse scientific cultures and this results in a wide array of scientific
practices and preferences that all coexist. Building on this body of work,
we conceptualize data science and psychiatry as two different, but not
necessarily incommensurable cultures of knowledge with their own
epistemic practices.
This conceptualization of data science and psychiatry as diverse
epistemic cultures is firmly grounded in literature. Scholars in-
vestigating data science have, for instance, pointed out how the field is
characterized by an epistemic tradition with a specific history that is
different from the epistemic culture described in literature about psy-
chiatry. It is known that data science is a relatively new field (Baru,
2019) that grew with the capacities to gather and analyse large
amounts of data and the increasing “datafication” of aspects of our life
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2014). It originated from computer
science, statistics and mathematics, but more explicitly engages with
“real” data under “real-world” constraints (Baru, 2019). A strong po-
sitive rhetoric and commercial successes led to the increased realization
that real data are a valuable commodity and new methods, infra-
structures, technologies and skills were being developed to handle these
data (Leonelli, 2014). The field is described as relatively a-theoretical,
as it is a general approach that can be applied to analyse data drawn
from a wide variety of fields and domains (Ribes, 2019).
Epistemically, the field of data science assumes that there is a (be it,
complex and multifaceted) real world or reality that can be better or
more completely captured by real-world data (Stevens et al., 2018;
Leonelli, 2014; Ribes, 2019). Thus, the field assumes that there is a
strong connection between the real-world and data. This sentiment
leads to the suggestion that we can know more and act better from the
careful grouping and analysis of real-world data and extrapolating them
into the future. This commitment to these data means that this field is
(in principle) respectful of any statistical relationship between two data
values and accepts that some relations might never be understandable
or explainable (Leonelli, 2014).
The field of psychiatry has a longer history than the field of data
science. Since the twentieth century, the field of psychiatry has un-
dergone numerous and by no means monolithic transformations
(Rüppel and Voigt, 2019). During this time, psychiatry has been in-
fluenced by the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement that re-
sulted in a preoccupation with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and
experimentation (Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Rüppel and Voigt,
2019) and also by the “molecularization of the “medical gaze” (Rose,
2007) that led to studies into genetics and biomarkers that aimed to
localize diseases within the body (Rüppel and Voigt, 2019). However,
the EBM-movement had more impact in other fields, as measurements
could be obtained under more controlled conditions and with more
exactitude and accuracy. Therefore, psychiatry can still be character-
ized by considerable uncertainty relating to disease ontology, treatment
effects and strong reliance on patient narratives.
Epistemically, the field of psychiatry assumes that diverse genetical,
neurobiological, environmental, biographical factors and the interac-
tions between them lead to the development of psychiatric diseases in
some people (Rüppel and Voigt, 2019). Thus, the field assumes that
there are (strong) causal connections, but they are complicated and
often unknown. This sentiment results in diverse kinds of research that
aim to capture relationships between events and outcomes. These stu-
dies and their evidence are consequently ranked and evaluated based
on their quality and conventions (Vidal and Ortega, 2017). The pre-
ference for specific research methods means that the field is critical
about scientific methods (e.g. large observational studies and RCTs are
preferred above individual case studies). This contributes to gaps in
evidence that need to be bridged by clinical interpretation in practice
(Rüppel and Voigt, 2019).
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This literature suggests that both data science and psychiatry as-
sume a strong and complex connection between events in the world and
data that are gathered about them. These data can be analysed and are,
in principle, a sound basis for decision-making. However, there are
differences in the sort of data and methods that are used and how they
are valued.
2.2. Epistemic virtues
In order to understand where and how the epistemic cultures of data
science and psychiatry differ and to study how these differences are
concretely negotiated in data-driven initiatives, we build on the concept
of epistemic virtues. Research in philosophy of science and STS have
shown that epistemic norms and values play a role in scientific com-
munities and guide what is perceived to be normal and acceptable
(Kuhn, 1962; Latour, 1987).
Epistemic virtues can be conceptualized as epistemic norms and
values that are internalized and acted upon by data scientists and
psychiatrists (Daston and Galison, 2007:40–41) and are one of the ways
of studying epistemic norms and values. Both data science and psy-
chiatry have internalized norms about, for instance, certainty, re-
presentativeness and objectivity. These can be understood as virtues
that are acted upon in specific ways, for example, in the judgements
that medical practitioners pass on one another's work. They do not use
the word “virtue” or “vice”, but their praise or blame often relates to
qualities of work that they consider “good” or “bad” (Paul, 2011:7). The
concept of epistemic virtues thus helps us to look ethnographically at
precisely those moments when specific judgements are made by data
scientists and psychiatry practitioners. Epistemic virtues enable us to
interpret such moments as not merely a methodological discussion, but
as examples that signal underlying differences in epistemic cultures.
In contrast to approaches that tend to list epistemic virtues con-
sidered relevant for knowledge gathering (e.g. Marcum, 2017; Pigliucci,
2017), our use of epistemic virtues stresses the dynamic and social
character of epistemic virtues (and hence also epistemic cultures). This
understanding of the notion emphasizes that: (1) epistemic virtues are
actively constructed and continuously re-evaluated and, (2) epistemic
virtues are situated, which means that people, often together, always
give meaning to epistemic virtues in specific circumstances.
We are inspired by the work of Daston and Galison (2007) around the
notion of “objectivity”. They showed how the meaning of the epistemic
virtue “objectivity” was (re)constructed throughout the years and showed
how objectivity was understood differently by scientists in the eighteenth,
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their approach inspired us to look at
the multiple interpretations that are given to epistemic virtues and what this
says about sameness and differences of two epistemic cultures. As a useful
addition to the work of Daston and Galison (2007), we suggest that the
notion of epistemic virtues is not only useful to study longitudinal changes
in scientific development, but can also be fruitfully applied to study the in
situ negotiation of differences in epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina, 1981).
2.3. Trading zones
While the notion of epistemic virtues enables us to ethnographically
focus on the differences in epistemic cultures through concrete moments of
judgment, the concept of trading zones allows us to zoom in on how these
differences are negotiated. We frame the data-driven initiative as a trading
zone (Galison, 1997). Galison (1997) also challenged the “epistemic unity of
the sciences” in his work about trading zones as he was intrigued by the
extraordinary variety and disunity of scientific languages and practices
(Galison and Stump, 1995). He analysed how distinct communities in
physics – such as theorists, experimentalists and engineers - create in-be-
tween vocabularies that facilitate communication and alignment of activ-
ities (Galison, 1997). These intermediating languages can range from simple
(interlanguages) to complex (“pidgin”) and eventually a shared language
can emerge (“creole”) (Collins et al., 2007; Galison, 1997). These languages
make it possible to interact and exchange goods despite differences and
without homogenizing the inherent diversity in their communities (Galison,
1997).
Galison's notion of trading zone is used as a tool to analyse a wide
variety of interactions between different communities, ranging from
cross-boundary interactions between surgeons and engineers (Baird and
Cohen, 1999), ways in which team members with different back-
grounds cooperate in a marketing firm (Kellogg et al., 2006) to com-
munication between NASA engineers and their subcontractors
(Vaughan, 1999). This body of (ethnographic) work continuously
stresses that the different communities do not meet each other “with
gaping incomprehension” (Harmen and Galison, 2008:568), but that
members of the diverse communities coordinate their actions tem-
porarily and locally. They navigate their differences in language and
culture only as needed (Kellogg et al., 2006; Galison, 1997) and this is
exactly what gives science its strength and coherence and underlies the
experience of scientific continuity (Galison and Stump, 1995).
The trading zone literature pays attention to the linguistic and
material components that help cross-boundary interactions. Galison
emphasized the importance of language right from the start. Later,
Collins et al. (2007) expanded on the linguistic understanding of
trading zones with their work on “interactional expertise”. This concept
highlights two things. First, that not only communities but also in-
dependent third parties can gain interactional expertise in talking to
both communities in some approximation of their language (Collins
et al., 2007; Collins and Evans, 2008). Second and more importantly,
interactional expertise emphasizes the social processes and tacit
knowledge that are passed on through language and that are important
to facilitate exchange (e.g. Epstein, 1996). This work highlights that
socialization is important for learning another culture because through
day-to-day immersion, people learn and understand the rules that
cannot be written down (Collins and Evans, 2008; Wehrens, 2015).
Besides the linguistic components, there has been a focus on ma-
terial, “boundary” (Star and Griesemer, 1989) objects that facilitate
exchanges largely in the absence of linguistic interactions. The objects
facilitate trading because they are “plastic enough to adapt to local
needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust
enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Star and
Griesemer, 1989:411). The objects can mean something distinctively
different to both parties and help interactions because they do not
vitiate the communities’ separate projects (Collins et al., 2007).
In this paper, we focus on the negotiation of epistemic differences and
while language and objects can help to facilitate exchange, much is still
unknown about the role of epistemic virtues in trading zones. Galison
(1997) remarks that communities can have diverse norms, values and vir-
tues. According to Galison (1997:401, 807), the communities persistently
try to incorporate the virtues of the other. However, a more in-depth ex-
ploration of the role of epistemic virtues in trading zones still has to be
developed. We aim to contribute to this development by paying attention to
precisely those moments in the initiative when specific judgements are
made by data scientists and psychiatry practitioners. We argue that the
focus on epistemic virtues as concrete moments of judgement can be a
useful additional dimension in the empirical study of trading zones, next to
linguistic and material dimensions developed by other authors.
3. Methods
3.1. Case description
This study focuses on a data-driven initiative by a psychiatric de-
partment in one of the largest Dutch University Hospitals. Combining
outpatient and inpatient treatment, this department contains four spe-
cialist units that specialize in affective, psychotic and developmental
disorders, acute and long-term care. The department treats approxi-
mately 2000 unique patients annually. There is a strong focus on re-
search in the department as it is linked to various research groups, and
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many psychiatric practitioners are also involved in research. Studies
focus, for example, on genetic predispositions, brain morphology, and
risk factors that play a role in the development of psychiatric disorders.
The department is well-established as a research centre, both in the
Netherlands and worldwide.
The data-driven initiative was initiated by the medical head of the
department in 2015 as she set out to experiment with data-driven
techniques to improve treatment for psychiatric patients, in addition to
research initiatives already being conducted in the hospital. The de-
partment attracted data scientists who had worked for the major
companies or were involved in data science start-ups. The initiative
secured the help of an IT company and acquired funding from the Dutch
government and other organizations. With these funds, the data sci-
entists could start pilots, build structures that automatically supplied
data and start working toward making care improvements for patients.
When we followed the initiative, the core of the data-driven team
comprised four data scientists, that were supported by multiple students, six
external data scientists and one data engineer. Students (e.g., medical,
psychology) helped the data scientists with small projects. The six external
data scientists were hired to work on short-term subprojects with specific
goals in mind (they followed the funding). The data engineer worked for the
university that was linked to the hospital and provided technical support.
At the time, the team worked on several data-driven subprojects.
Besides presenting straightforward business analytics (e.g. how often is
a certain medicine prescribed?), the team worked on developing deci-
sion-support systems that would aid psychiatrists by making predictions
based on machine learning algorithms and experimented with the im-
plementation of the machine learning models. Two major subprojects
tried to predict which antipsychotic or antidepressant would be the
most effective while producing the least side effects for certain patients.
These projects were relevant because they would (1) avoid the current
trial and error method, where psychiatrists must try several drugs be-
fore finding the right one; (2) reduce hospital stay; (3) be expandable to
other psychiatric medication in the future.
3.2. Data collection
Our empirical analysis builds on a combination of qualitative
methods. First, MS observed the data-driven team between September
2017 and February 2018 (approximately 200 h). After an initial
meeting with the medical head of the department and the leader of the
data-driven team in which we explained our research focus, we could
meet and shadow the data-driven team. MS shadowed the data scien-
tists while they were doing their analyses and followed them around to
meetings in the hospital, taking field notes to capture the setting and
interactions between data scientists, medical staff and researchers
(Oldenhof, 2015). MS introduced herself and the research to all in-
volved and made sure ongoing informed consent was obtained. In-
formal conversations helped build rapport and provided insights into
the pertinent issues and tensions. The field notes were expanded as soon
as possible and discussed with RW and AdB.
Second, MS conducted seventeen semi-structured interviews with
nineteen people (directly and indirectly involved with the data-driven in-
itiative) to explore particular topics in more depth: nine data scientists, three
psychiatrists, two nurses, one data engineer, one data manager, one con-
sultant, one hospital manager and one medical researcher. The interviews
posed open questions about the initiative and the collaboration, such as:
how do you go on collaborate with others? All interviews lasted 40–60 min
and were recorded and transcribed ad verbatim. We asked permission for
the interviews, the use of quotes and anonymized the material.
Finally, MS conducted an analysis of online and offline doc-
umentation about the initiative, such as presentations and newsletters.
This resulted in more than 400 pages related to the initiative. An ethical
waiver was obtained for the study.
3.3. Data analysis
We began our analysis with open coding (Mortelmans, 2007). We per-
formed general readings and highlighted notable passages in the data. For
example, we marked passages in which practitioners from one community
expressed that they did not understand the other community. MS conducted
most of the analysis, but researcher triangulation ensured that key themes
emerging from the analysis were discussed and refined (Mortelmans, 2007).
Through several iterations of the analytical process, we focused on three key
categories: (1) epistemic claims and ideas, (2) the negotiations and discus-
sions between data-driven and psychiatry practitioners, and (3) the co-
ordination of the meanings and ideas about knowledge production.
Although analysis began with open coding, the total process employed
an abductive approach involving an iterative to-and-from between analy-
tical themes and relevant theoretical concepts (Timmermans and Tavory,
2012). After identifying the literature on trading zones and epistemic virtues
as crucially relevant for the analysis of the empirical material, we developed
the analysis further through posing such questions; (1) what is traded here,
by whom and where? (2) Which epistemic virtues are in play? (3) What
does this say about the respective epistemic cultures?
In the end, our analysis focused on eighteen key practitioners involved
in the initiative. Table 1 provides an overview of the practitioners per
community, their role and data collected about them. The remaining people
Table 1
Overview of key practitioners of both communities.
Practice Practitioners Main involvement Data collection
Data science Internal data scientist A Team leader, all research projects Interview, observations (17 days)
Internal data scientist B Antipsychotic project Interview, observation (18 days)
Internal data scientist C Antipsychotic project Interview
Internal data scientist D Antidepressant project Interview, observation (16 days)
External data scientist E Antipsychotic project Interview, observation (6 days)
External data scientist F Antipsychotic project Interview, observation (7 days)
External data scientist G Antidepressant project Interview, observation (11 days)
PhD, data scientist H Various projects Interview, 12 days present in observations
Psychiatry Psychiatrist I Professor, medical head of department, initiator of the data-driven team, various research
projects
Interview, observation (4 days)
Psychiatrist J Department head, studied schizophrenia, antipsychotic project Observation (2 days)
Psychiatrist K Studied social cognition in schizophrenia, antidepressant and antipsychotic project Observation (3 days)
Psychiatrist L Studied gene-environment interaction and antipsychotic project Observation (3 days)
Psychiatrist M Studied developmental disorders in children. Advisor to the data-driven team Interview
Psychiatrist N Studied genetic predispositions in relation to mental illnesses, antidepressant project Interview, observation (3 days)
Researcher O Assistant professor, expertise in neuroimaging. Advisor to the data-driven team Interview
Researcher P Assistant professor, expertise in genetic epidemiology, antipsychotic project Observation (2 days)
Nurse Q Involved in antidepressant project Interview, observation (1 day)
Nurse R Advisor of the data-driven team Interview
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under observation had a minor role in the trading process. Their interviews
helped to gain more information about the structure of the trading zone and
details of the various projects. Due to time constraints and high workloads,
not all psychiatric practitioners could be interviewed.
We incorporated member checks in various phases. During data
collection, we kept in touch with two (key) respondents to clarify un-
clear situations. After the data collection, we presented our initial re-
sults and a first draft of the paper to gain feedback on our analysis. The
respondents recognized their work in the analysis, and pointed out
minor misunderstandings (e.g. datasets were updated on a weekly basis
instead of daily basis). We presented the final draft of the paper to our
respondents to gain their permission to use quotes and asked them to
check our use of this material (Mortelmans, 2007).
4. Results
In the next section, we will present the hospital-based data-driven
initiative and the data science and psychiatry practitioners involved.
Afterwards, we analyse the process of trading epistemic differences,
illustrated by two examples derived from data science subprojects de-
veloped in the initiative.
4.1. The trading zone
We learned that not all the psychiatry practitioners greeted the data
scientists with enthusiasm, when they arrived at the hospital. There
were diverse criticisms. Some psychiatrists were sceptical because of
previous costly, time-intensive ICT projects had limited added value.
Others said that the rapid nature of developments in data analysis
would quickly outdate any initiative. They argued it would be better to
wait and see how techniques developed in other contexts. Also, some
questioned the methods used. Psychiatrist M explains:
“When they first presented the ideas [on the initiative], I really had to
hear them a few times and think about them. That's how it works for me!
(…). I've learned to be very suspicious of connections that you find in
data. The more you look for certain connections, the greater the chance
that you will find one, but it could well be complete nonsense.” (Interview
psychiatrist M)
The data scientists decided to focus their attention on psychiatry prac-
titioners who were enthusiastic about the initiative and willing to cooperate.
The psychiatry practitioners who participated in the data-driven initiative
hoped to find new sorts of information that could help them to improve the
treatment of patients. Several psychiatrists described the unpredictability of
psychiatric diseases. They mentioned, patients with long-lasting depression
who unexpectedly recovered, patients who benefited from strange combi-
nations of medicines or patients who developed severe, unanticipated side
effects. Psychiatrists relied on a combination of scientific evidence and their
professional experience to treat patients but realized that their experience
did not always provide clear evidence and contained biases. As psychiatrist I
explained:
“We try to treat patients to the best of our ability, but often we would like
to have more information. There are guidelines for extreme situations,
but there is a large gray area. Those guidelines are fine, we don't need to
change them, but we do need more guidance in this gray area. We don't
know much; there is simply not a lot of evidence. We need some sort of …
intermediate evidence.” (Interview psychiatrist I)
The data scientists kept in touch with the medical practitioners
through face-to-face meetings, via e-mail and by accompanying them
on the daily rounds. We observed practitioners in both communities
discussing the data that could be included in a prediction model, vali-
dating preliminary machine learning outcomes and brainstorming on
verifying the decision-support models. We highlight two cases: the first
case is illustrative of the majority of the negotiations we observed. The
second case because negotiations were most fierce and challenging.
4.2. Negotiations during the development of a prediction model for
antidepressants
The first case is of a typical meeting between data scientists and
psychiatrists. The meeting is part of the trajectory in which the data
scientists are trying to develop a prediction model that will help de-
termine which antidepressant is best for certain groups of patients.
During this meeting, data scientists (A, D and G) and psychiatrist N are
sitting in N's small office. The data scientists have extensively studied
prescription data and guidelines and have had similar meetings with
other psychiatry practitioners. Now, they want to validate their findings
and come to a decision about how to proceed.
Case 1: How to define a successful treatment?
The meeting starts with a discussion about prescription behaviour
and the possible side effects of antidepressants. Data scientist G
explains that the data scientists are trying to distinguish between
“successful” and “unsuccessful” medical treatment as the first step
in developing their prediction model. After consulting with var-
ious psychiatrists and studying the guidelines, he is considering
the following conditions. First, a drug must have been prescribed
for a minimum amount of time, so that it has enough time to be
effective. Second, the Hamilton depression score [a measure of
the severity of depression] must be at least 50% lower than on the
patient's admission date or should be equal to 8 [indicating suf-
ficient improvement or a “normal” value]. He is thinking of in-
cluding Beck scores and the Functional Disability Inventory [both
aimed at measuring depression severity]. The only problem is
that they are embedded in text fields in the patient files, which
makes them hard to use. Data scientist D adds that they have
heard from other psychiatrists that MADRS [another depression
scale] might be relevant. However, they noticed in the data that
medical professionals in this hospital do not use the MADRS scale.
Data scientist G argues that the Hamilton score seems most im-
portant. Psychiatrist N nods in agreement, but sighs: “What a shame
that it’s so hard to analyse free text fields in patient files.” Data sci-
entist G explains that they are unsure about the “50% lower” or
“equal to 8” criteria as these seem quite random threshold levels.
Psychiatrist N disagrees because, according to him, most medication
studies use the same threshold levels. He gives some context: “A
Hamilton score can go up to around 25 points when someone is se-
verely depressed. You should be more worried about measurement
variation because medical students fill out the questionnaire with the
patients during their internships and they don't always take it ser-
iously.” This is new to the data scientists, but, as data scientist A
remarks; “We do not really have another measure that we can use, so
this is our best option.” Psychiatrist N agrees.
Data scientist G shows a graph of the current distribution of
Hamilton scores for patients treated with antidepressants [see Fig. 1
for a similar but fictional graph]. The graph reveals that only a small
portion of patients lands in the “lower or equal to a score of 8” (area
1), meaning that they have had “successful treatment” according to
the current criteria. A more substantial group of patients have had
successful treatment if “50% improvement” (area 2) is also con-
sidered. A few patients show a partial response (area 3), and even
fewer show no or a negative response (area 4). The data scientists
suggest also including patients with partial response (area 2 and 3) in
their definition of “successful”, as their Hamilton scores improved
after medical treatment.
Psychiatrist N looks at the graph more closely and remarks
that the graph is different than what he would have expected,
based on the scientific literature. He asks the data scientists what
sorts of data they used to make the graph. He goes to his com-
puter, intending to look up a scientific study, when suddenly his
phone rings, interrupting the meeting. Something is happening to
one of his patients. It seems quite serious because psychiatrist N
excuses himself and, heading off to the ward, adds, “We must
continue this conversation next week.” (Observation notes).
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This first case shows how the data scientists and psychiatrist ne-
gotiate on the data to include and adequate threshold levels. During the
meeting, they were able to navigate some of their differences and make
the decision to base the prediction model solely on the Hamilton data.
At one point, the data scientists were afraid to lose their last data source
(Hamilton data) when psychiatrist N started to talk about measurement
variation. At that moment, both parties decided pragmatically to use
the Hamilton data as it was “the best option”.
The trading process took place during formal meetings and it helped
that the data scientists learned to speak in the vocabulary of ques-
tionnaires and depression scales that is understandable for the psy-
chiatrist. Simultaneously, psychiatrist N confirmed the struggles of the
data scientists and contributed to the negotiations by stating “what a
shame that it’s so hard to analyse free text fields”, thereby showing that
he understood the importance of these data for the data scientists. The
trading process was also stimulated by the systematic approach of the
data scientists. This virtue was recognized by psychiatrist N. He un-
derstood the importance of determining outcome measures, as it was
also an important part of the scientific research he conducted in the
past. The graph also helped to visualize the threshold dilemma and
thereby contributed to the cross-boundary interactions.
There were also epistemic virtues that needed to be negotiated. The
data scientists looked for completeness in the data. They wanted to in-
clude as much data about depressions as possible; several measure-
ments, qualitative data and data of patients that partially respond to the
treatment. At the same time, psychiatrist N was more selective about the
data to use and threshold levels to select. N referred to scientific studies
during the meeting. With his mentioning of scientific literature, he
brought in authority and the rich scientific history of psychiatry. He
stressed the importance of being selective in the kinds of data to include
and thresholds to uphold while simultaneously highlighting the em-
beddedness of psychiatry in practice.
4.3. Negotiations during the implementation of a prediction model for
antipsychotics
The second case highlights a trading process about the importance
of statistical significance between data science and psychiatry practi-
tioners. The discussion became most evident during the antipsychotics
subproject. Within this project, both parties had to negotiate the stan-
dards and measures to uphold for determining the performance of the
prediction model and the conditions under which the model could be
implemented in healthcare practice.
Case 2: When to introduce a machine learning model in daily
healthcare routines?
The psychiatry practitioners needed certainty that the models
would significantly improve current healthcare practices. They
argued that, while not perfect, statistical significance would be a
necessary step to test the performance of the models before in-
troducing them in daily healthcare practices, since it would help
determine the reliability and ensure that the success of the model
was not based on chance. They argued that it was necessary to set
up a RCT-inspired approach, in which the performance of the
model would be tested against care-as-usual.
The data scientists did not completely understand the focus on
statistical significance. Some of the data scientists previously
worked in the commercial sector, where they never had to work
with statistical significance. They searched for findings with the
biggest impact and tended to look at prediction accuracy instead
of statistical significance. Data scientist G explained: “If you
started to talk about significance in such a [commercial] setting, ev-
erybody would look at you and say: “what are you talking about?”
(Interview data scientist G). The data scientists explained that they
use their own methods to validate their findings and to see if their
model is performing well:
Data scientist E: “Significance is just not that interesting with techni-
ques like machine learning! Well, that might be a bit exaggerated, but
…”
Data scientist C: “It is not the ONLY measure!”
Data scientist E: “We often use lots of data to generate our models,
when significance is not necessarily the most important measure.
There are other ways to validate that your model is doing well and in
what circumstances.” (Interview data scientists C and E).
The notion of statistical significance caused misunderstanding
and miscommunication. At the beginning of the project, the data
scientists had proudly presented some of their initial findings
when a psychiatry practitioner asked if the results were statisti-
cally significant. The data scientists answered that such a statis-
tical test was less important nowadays. It was more important to
validate your findings with medical professionals. Psychiatric
researcher O was critical about this approach:
“I don't agree with the approach. I mean, I think you still have to make
sure that a result is statistically significant and not produced by
chance, so I wonder about dismissing this statistical test as somewhat
unimportant.” (Interview psychiatric researcher O).
The presentation of the data scientists had ended with a fierce
discussion and became a story that was retold in both commu-
nities.
During the end of our fieldwork, uncertainty remained about the
conditions under which the data scientists could implement their
machine learning models in practice. The psychiatry practitioners
continued to hold the opinion that statistical significance was crucial
for the evaluation of the prediction models. Some argued that data
scientists should not even present non-statistically significant findings
to them, as this could negatively influence their behaviour. Data
scientists stated, by contrast, that “it would be a pity not to use all the
non-significant results. You waste a lot of information that could be used to
our advantage” (data scientist F).
The data scientists tried to obtain some leeway by organizing
meetings with psychiatry practitioners that were interested in their
methods. This allowed the data scientists to explain their alternative
validation methods. Also, strategic meetings with more senior staff
were organized to bring both parties together and make workable
agreements. Simultaneously, the data scientists agreed with the RCT-
approach to compare their models with care-as-usual as they under-
stood the benefit of such a comparison.
Fig. 1. Distribution of Hamilton scores for patients treated with anti-
depressants. Each dot represents an individual patient.
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This second case shows how data science and psychiatry practi-
tioners negotiated about the implementation of the machine learning
models in practice. There was a partial compromise as both parties
agreed on the RCT-approach to compare the prediction model against
the care-as-usual. The data scientists did see the value of this approach
and understood the responsibilities of the medical practitioners.
However, the negotiations were far more intense and developed dif-
ferently than in the first case.
In this case, trading was for the large part done by backstage poli-
tics. The data scientists did set up meetings with interested medical
practitioners to make them familiar with their epistemic culture and to
teach them their “language”. Besides, the strategic meetings with senior
staff were organized. These persons were respected by both commu-
nities and could stimulate the negotiations. Also it helped that both the
data science and psychiatry practitioners felt that data, models and
outcomes had to be verified and recognized the importance of having
validation standards as a virtue. The negotiation process that unfolded
was about the sort of validation process to use.
There were epistemic virtues that needed to be negotiated and this
was not straightforward. The psychiatry practitioners, while en-
thusiastic about the prediction models, were reluctant to introduce
these models into their care routines. They needed certainty about the
functioning of the model and the methodologies used. This was not
necessarily unwillingness from their part, as it also ties closely to the
various epistemic responsibilities and risks that they face (e.g. treat-
ment responsibility and malpractice claims). The data scientists could
be more flexible in the outcomes and evidence they selected as they do
not face these responsibilities and risks. The flexibility was also visible
in the statement of data scientist E when he talked about validating that
“the model is doing well in certain circumstances”. This shows that, for
the data scientists, the necessary degree of flexibility or certainty was
dependent on the impact of the analysis. This would mean that a data-
driven model for deciding on deep brain stimulation needed more as-
surances than a model used for scheduling staff. This more dynamic use
of information meant that data scientists often accepted more flexibility
in their methods and stressed that they might have to revise their
analyses after a few years or based on new data.
The trading process, in this case, was more difficult than in the first
case. It was not helpful that both communities retold stories (such as
about the discussion on statistical significance) within their own com-
munities as it emphasized the differences between the communities.
The negotiations were already difficult, especially because the virtues
(flexibility versus certainty) were so different and complex statistical
theories clouded the discussions.
The field of psychiatry is used to be working with causal inference
and research that looks for causation. This type of research aims to give
answers to questions such as: “how much more effective is anti-
psychotic A compared to antipsychotic B for (a group of) patients?”.
Medical practitioners can use this information to change the treatment
practice for their patients. The practice of prediction modelling of the
data scientists is based on another statistical theory. This type of re-
search tries to predict what the chance is that someone improves when
prescribed a particular type of antipsychotic. As such, it allows medical
practitioners to be reactive to situations. It, for example, presents the
chance that a side effect will occur in a patient and this enables psy-
chiatrists to anticipate on the side effects. The discussions about sig-
nificance illustrate that it is complicated to understand and act upon
these different sorts of information. Causality thinking forms such a
considerable aspect of the culture of psychiatry and is so embodied by
all practitioners, that might be difficult to grasp alternative approaches
and vice versa.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we study the convergence and divergence of the
epistemic cultures of psychiatry and data science. We argue that such
similarities or differences are not pre-given but depend on situated
negotiations and actions. Through the notions of “trading zones” and
“epistemic virtues”, we have been able to analyse how differences be-
tween epistemic cultures are negotiated in situ by data science and
psychiatry practitioners. In this discussion, we argue that our combined
theoretical framework offers a fresh way to study how cooperation
between diverse practitioners develops and where it can be improved.
We make a call to bring epistemic differences into the open as it makes
a grounded discussion about the added value of data-driven initiatives
and the role they can play in healthcare, possible.
Our ethnographic approach showed that practitioners from both
communities actively sought collaboration to improve care for psy-
chiatric patients. Many epistemic differences needed to be negotiated.
Situated judgments about the need for being complete or selective in
the data to include and about the amount of flexibility or certainty that
is permissible, revealed the role of specific epistemic virtues. We found
that it is not simply the case that diverse communities persistently try to
incorporate the epistemic virtues of the other (Galison, 1997:401, 807).
The dynamics are more complex and far messier as epistemic virtues get
their meaning in concrete practices.
Our study of the data-driven initiative shows how epistemic dif-
ferences are traded locally and temporarily. Our work aligns with
earlier work on trading zones in highlighting the importance of
boundary objects (the graph in the first case), interactional expertise
(data scientists learning the medical language in the first case) and
socialization (data scientists becoming embedded in the culture of
psychiatric measurements in the first case) in stimulating cross-
boundary interactions (Galison and Stump, 1995; Galison, 1997; Knorr
Cetina, 1999). Our research adds to this literature by highlighting two
additional processes. First, our work shows the importance of validation
of the other culture in helping to navigate differences. The remark of
the psychiatrist in case 1 about how unfortunate it was that free text
fields are so hard to analyse, showed that he learned enough about the
culture of the data scientists, and by explicating these differences he
showed respect for the other culture. Second, shared epistemic virtues,
such as the systematic approach and the validation standards, helped to
stimulate the negotiation processes and create space for negotiation,
despite differences.
In both cases, the communities were able to navigate some of the
differences in culture. However, the negotiations in the second case
were more complicated, because epistemic virtues were too different
(e.g. flexibility and certainty) and hidden within complex statistical
theories. What also complicated the interactions, was the retelling of
stories that emphasized the epistemic differences.
The study has two limitations. First, our distinction between the two
subcultures might be considered too simplistic or artificial as there is
never just one single data-driven culture nor only one medical culture
(Harmen and Galison, 2008; Knorr Cetina, 1981). We argue that while
there is variation, there is ample evidence that shows an overarching
medical and data-driven epistemic culture as we described in our the-
oretical framework. For the purpose of this study, aimed at exploring
the similarities and differences in epistemic culture, we drew a division
based on the participants’ positions in the hospital-based initiative, but
different divisions could be made.
Second, while rich in detail and extended with other data collection
methods, our ethnographic study of this data-driven initiative lasted six
months. The relatively short timeframe made it impossible to observe,
more longitudinal process changes, such as the development of shared
language or more gradual changes in epistemic virtues. As such, more
longitudinal ethnographic research projects, following data-driven in-
itiatives over an extended period, would be a welcome addition.
We argue that it is important to bring epistemic differences into the
open as this enables a grounded discussion about the added value of
data-driven initiatives and the role they can play in healthcare. This
study shows the added value of ethnographic, action-based research in
making subtle differences in epistemic cultures visible in concrete data-
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driven initiatives. Data-science initiatives are not impossible or simply
possible in healthcare and epistemic virtues help to study where pro-
blems arise and how practitioners deal with them. This approach helps
to make a more grounded discussion possible, about the type of data to
include, thresholds to uphold and the necessary steps for the im-
plementation of prediction models.
Such ethnographic studies can subsequently be used to organize
moments of reflexivity for data-science and healthcare practitioners, for
example, by starting initiatives and experiments that stimulate discus-
sions. Think of organizing focus groups and data deliberation sessions,
involving the relevant communities, such as professionals, patients,
data scientists, researchers and policymakers, to explore the epistemic
differences and similarities (Haan et al., 2018; Madsen and Munk,
2019; Moats and Seaver, 2019; Ziewitz, 2017). Epistemic cultures are
not fixed, and they can change. The epistemic cultures of data science
and psychiatry are in some respects relatively similar but also differ in
myriad ways. It is highly relevant to study the differences and see how
both cultures can learn from each other.
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